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Introduction 
Nowadays, capital structure decision has become a subject matter in the field of corporate finance (Saona, San 
Martín, & Jara, 2018). Capital structure means how a firm is financing on its overall operations and growth by 
using different sources of funds (Ahmad, Saboor, & Nouman, 2018; A. Shah & Khan, 2007). It is the 
combination of both debt and equity financings and at the same time, it also reduces the cost of capital 
(Haron, 2018). Debt may be occurred in various forms like as issuance of bonds and note payable, while 
equity may have come in form of common stock, preferred stock and or retained earnings (Ahmad et al., 
2018). 
Capital structure is also concerned with the financial structure decision of a firm. The capital structure 
decisions of a firm are very crucial because it referred to the ability of a firm and also fulfill the requirements 
of its stakeholders (Bajagai, Keshari, Bhetwal, Sah, & Jha, 2019). Its formation is also very important for every 
business organization (Turan & Hasanaj, 2014) that generate growth and firm valuation (Voulgaris, Asteriou, 
& Agiomirgianakis, 2004). Firms having a higher growth rate are more profitable for business than other 
firms. Because these firms are more successful due to high-risk investment activities (Grewatsch & 
Kleindienst, 2017). Growth is a generic strategy of a firm to increase its long term performance. Long-term 
performance is a very critical decision for every business success in a competitive environment (Ghorbal-Blal, 
2008).  
Optimal capital structure can maximize the value of the firm and minimize the cost of capital (Arulvel & 
Ajanthan, 2013). It becomes very difficult for financial managers to examine the proper use of the optimal 
capital structure for any organization. So, the major discussion on the corporate capital structure was started 
by (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) through Irrelevance theory. According to this theory, there is a perfect capital 
market and usually firm has its independent value on corporate capital structure. But a few years later, 
extensive research has been done and it was explained that financial leverage also affects the value of the firm 
due to its tax-shield benefits. Firms with higher debt level bear low tax expenses and this may reduce the 
weighted average cost of capital. Agency theory by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) recognizes that the proper use 
of capital structure can resolve the conflicts of interests among managers and shareholders. The Trade-off 
theory (Myers, 1977) describes the gap of Irrelevance theory, that contains on the advantages and 
disadvantages of capital structure. In contradiction of Trade-off theory, Pecking-order theory may not consist 
of the optimal capital structure decision and simply it reduced the information asymmetry. Consequently, 
(Myers, 1984) stated that firms prefer to internal funds on external funds of equity financing.  
Although there are many previous studies that have examined the association of ownership concentration and 
capital structure (Bunkanwanicha, Gupta, & Rokhim, 2008; Q. Liu, Tian, & Wang, 2011). But in Pakistan, 
many studies have particularly focused on corporate governance and capital structure decisions (Ahmad et al., 
2018; Ahmed Sheikh & Wang, 2012; M. H. Shah, Zuoping, Abdullah, & Shah, 2018). 
Capital structure decisions are also influenced by ownership structure variables (Bajagai et al., 2019). 
However, the ownership concentration is commonly used throughout the world that plays a significant role in 
the firm’s capital structure decisions and also on corporate governance practices. Ownership concentration is 
concerned with the number of shares owned by individuals and largest block shareholders (as at least 5% of 
equity ownership hold by top shareholders of the firm) (Paramanantham, Ting, & Kweh, 2018). Ownership 
concentration has a great influence on capital structure decision-making policies (Bany-Ariffin, Nor, & 
McGowan Jr, 2010; G. Liu & Sun, 2010). So this research has been conducted to fulfill the existing of 
research gap; in order to examine the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure. 
There are some contributions to the literature. First, it analyzes the nature of capital structure decisions, which 
resolves the issues of stakeholders of firms; likes as a shareholder, managers, and debt holders. Second, it 
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covers the shortage of empirical studies in contributing to the relationship between ownership structure and 
capital structure. This study will be helpful for the investors to create such portfolios, which give them 
maximum profit. This study will also important and enable the investors on how to choose an appropriate 
capital structure decisions and ownership structures of the firm. 
Literature Review 
Discussion on financial structure started by (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), with the concept of three other 
theories. First and foremost discussion of financial structure argued by (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), who 
explained the concept of irrelevance capital structure theory. It states that capital structure does not affect to 
firm value. This shows that an increase in debt level has no significant impact on the cost of capital. They 
further assumed that in the perfect capital market, there is no tax charged, no bankruptcy cost, no transaction 
cost, and information asymmetry among the participants of capital structure. However, in the real world, 
there are taxes, transaction cost, and bankruptcy costs, etc. Therefore, the above assumption was finding 
unrealistic because it has not shown any significant impact on optimal capital structure (Marobhe & es 
Salaam-Tanzania, 2014). In later, the theory was concluded that capital structure has an impact on firm value 
due to tax shield benefits which reduce the value of debt and increase the firm performance. 
Trade-off theory is an expansion of MM theory. It suggests that firm optimal capital structure affected by 
firm taxes, transaction cost, and bankruptcy cost. Use of debt can maximize the benefits of the tax shield. 
According to (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973) this theory stated the benefits optimal capital mix by both tax 
shield benefits and cost associated with debt as financial distress and bankruptcy cost. Pecking Order Theory 
first contributes by (Donaldson, 1961) that managers should know about the asymmetric information of the 
firm than outside of the investors. It means the cost of financing enhancing with asymmetric information. 
Financing comes from three sources as internal funds, debt, and equity. This summarized that the company 
should use first internal funds and then only used external funds at last sort. Pecking order theory was 
modified by (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and suggested that equity is a less favorable source to increase the capital. 
When managers issue new equity, managers think that the firm is overvalued and managers are using the 
benefits of this overvaluation. Then firms prefer to use debt rather than equity. Agency Theory by (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) stated that there is a conflict of interest among shareholders and managers. They do not want 
to share the same interest. This may lead to the principal and agent problems. Debt financing is a way to 
minimize the conflicts of interest that are reducing the agency cost. At last, a high level of leverage can reduce 
agency cost and improve firm performance. 
Debt is the most suitable source of financing when firms are unable to use their own resources for their 
business (Bae, Kim, & Oh, 2017). Those firms, which have high tangible assets, will be able to give collateral 
for debts. When a company becomes defaulter on debt, the assets will be seized and the company can be 
saved from bankruptcy. So the companies with high tangible assets have fewer chances to default. (Salehi, 
Lotfi, & Farhangdoust, 2017) the study investigates the impact of financial distress cost of ownership 
concentration and capital structure. They employed panel data of 786 listed firms of the Tehran Stock 
Exchange for the period of five years (2010-2015). They used 2SLS and findings of their study shows that 
ownership concentration is significant positive associated with firm capital structure. The study of (Saona et 
al., 2018) discussed the affiliation of firms in the context of business groups and also measures the impact of 
ownership concentration on capital structure decision of Chilean firms. It was found that group affiliation 
business enjoys the internal capital markets that minimize the demand for external debt and mostly 
shareholders of these affiliated business groups have control over managers. Research of (Farooq, 2015) 
measures the link between ownership concentration and capital structure of MENA countries. They employ 
Pooled regression analysis on panel data for the period of 2005-2009. Their findings show a significant 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure. Another study by (Santos, 
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Moreira, & Vieira, 2014) concluded that ownership concentration is negatively associated with financial 
leverage.  
(Paramanantham et al., 2018) measures the relationship between ownership concentration and debt policy in 
the context of Malaysian firms. They used panel regression analysis based on Top 100 public listed firms of 
Malaysia over a period of five years (2011-2015). Findings panel regression analysis show that ownership 
concentration is significant negative related to financial structure. (Granado‐ Peiró & López‐ Gracia, 2017) 
the research investigates the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure of Spanish listed 
firms by using panel data over the period of 2005 to 2011. They used Panel fixed effects and system GMM 
and both specifications show a non-monotonic association between ownership concentration and capital 
structure. A study by (Céspedes, González, & Molina, 2010) concentrated on ownership concentration and 
the determinants of capital structure in Latin America firms. The data were gathered from seven countries. It 
was concluded that ownership concentration is positively influenced by leverage and growth is also positively 
associated with leverage. (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Pindado & de La Torre, 2011) also demonstrated that 
ownership concentration is positively associated with leverage. Research by (Drobetz, Janzen, & Requejo, 
2018) documented the efficiency of capital allocation over the shipping firms. They also investigate the impact 
of ownership concentration on firm’s value. A sample size of 126 listed firms was analyzed for the time of 
1997-2016. End results of their research explain that ownership concentration has a positive impact on the 
value of the firm.   
Hypothesis Development  
Ownership Concentration and Capital Structure 
Ownership concentration is explained as the number of largest block holders. They reduce the agency 
problems among managers and shareholders and also control the investor’s decisions on investment. These 
largest block holders can also effectively and efficiently monitor the management decisions making policies 
that give more benefits to shareholders. A study by (Paramanantham et al., 2018) argued that ownership 
concentration is negatively associated with capital structure. According to (Farooq, 2015; Mehran, 1992), 
there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure of the firms. So, it is 
stated that: 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure. 
Profitability and Capital Structure 
The profitability of the firm is measured through return on assets and also calculated by earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets (Briones & Chang, 2017). It shows that how much a firm earned by an 
investment of the assets and how the managers use effectively the investor's fund (Vătavu, 2015) or in other 
words it generates an idea about how efficient management using its assets to generate large earnings (Nawaz 
& Haniffa, 2017). According to the agency theory by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), higher leverage is expected 
to have higher agency costs due to diverging interests between shareholders and debt holders and thereby 
leads to a decline in firm’s performance. The assumptions of the pecking order theory by (Myers, 1984; Myers 
& Majluf, 1984) also predicted a negative relationship between leverage and firm profitability. Many 
researchers from all over the world have studied particularly on the capital structure to measure the impact of 
debt policy and firm performance (Abor, 2005; Muchiri, Muturi, & Ngumi, 2016; Sadeghian, Latifi, Soroush, 
& Aghabagher, 2012; Salim & Yadav, 2012). Some studies found a positive impact on capital structure and 
firm performance (Abor, 2005) and some studies found negative effects between profitability and leverage 
(Liaqat et al., 2017; Tsuruta, 2017; Vithessonthi & Tongurai, 2015). So, we can formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between profitability and capital structure. 
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Tangibility and Capital Structure 
Tangibility is concerned with the number of assets that are used as collaterals for getting loans. It is a ratio 
measured by fixed assets to total assets (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Pecking order theory predicted a negative 
association, while agency theory stated a positive relationship between leverage and tangibility (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991). Some studies found a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage (Bevan & Danbolt, 
2002; Huang, 2006; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999). Whereas, (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc‐ Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2001; Mazur, 2007; Mukherjee & Mahakud, 2010) also found a negative relationship because 
larger firms have a high level of tangible assets that lead to both debt and equity financing. Therefore, firms 
can use a target capital structure in different projects. Thus: 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between tangibility and capital structure. 
Board Size and Capital Structure 
As explains by (Adams & Mehran, 2003) largest board size can control the managers and firm performance 
effectively. (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) stated that the largest board size has less standing and face many 
conflicts and difficulties as compare to small board size. A study by (Berger & Udell, 1994) concluded that 
there is a significant negative relationship between board size and financing decisions. In views of (Saad, 
2010) there is a significant positive association among board size and firm capital structure. While 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999) find a negative but insignificant relationship between board size and capital 
structure. As (Ofek & Yermack, 1997) described that firms with larger board size lead to having less amount 
of debt because they force the management to use less amount of debt in order to avoid high-risk met by 
investors. Hence, the following hypothesis is used in this study. 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between board size and capital structure. 
Firm Size and Capital Structure 
According to (Abdullah, 2005; Briones & Chang, 2017) firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets of the firm. Normally, firm size is positively related to capital structure. Because the larger firms 
normally prefer to a high level of debt and smaller firms afford the small level of debt (Rajput & Chawla, 
2019). There are different studies that found a positive relationship between firm size and capital structure 
(Friend & Lang, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). So,  
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between firm size and capital structure. 
Methodology 
The overall population consists of all chemical firms listed in Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. There are 
42 chemical sector firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. But the current study used the sample 
size of 26 firms listed in the chemical sector of KSE due to inconvenience and non-availability of the data. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
In order to measure the impact of ownership concentration on capital structure, we consider the dependent 
variable capital structure measured by three debt ratios. STD measured as short term debt/total assets (Abor, 
2007; Ahsan, Man, & Qureshi, 2016). Long term debt measured as the long term debt/total assets (Ahsan et 
al., 2016; Ramadan, 2013)  Total debt ratio is calculated by total debt/total assets (Ahsan et al., 2016; Salim & 
Yadav, 2012; Vieira, 2017). 
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Independent Variable 
The current study analyzed “Ownership Concentration” (OWCN) as an independent variable. It is calculated 
as a percentage of equity held by the top 5 substantial shareholders of the firm (Paramanantham et al., 2018; 
Xinyuan, Nan, & Yufei, 2017).  
Control Variable 
In addition to firm ownership concentration, the current study also used many other controlling variables like 
as Return on Asset (ROA) measured by EBIT/ total assets (Riaz, 2015), Tangibility (TANG) is calculated by 
fixed assets / total assets (Kayo & Kimura, 2011; A. Shah & Khan, 2007) and Board Size (BSIZE), as 
measured by log of number of board of directors (Abor, 2007; Kajananthan, 2012; Khawaja, Bhatti, Ashraf, & 
Henry, 2018). Firm size (FSIZE) is calculated by the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm (Abdullah, 
2005; Briones & Chang, 2017). 
Model Specification 
In order to examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm’s financial structure adjustment of 
chemical sector of Pakistan, we used a Panel least square regression, which is most widely used in finance-
related previous studies. Following econometric models are used to measure the impact: 
STDit= β0 + β1OWCNit + β2ROAit + β3TANGit + β4BSIZEit + β5FSIZEit + εt….. (1) 
LTDit= β0 + β1OWCNit + β2ROAit + β3TANGit + β4BSIZEit + β5FSIZEit + εt….. (2) 
TDit = β0 + β1OWCNit + β2ROAit + β3TANGit + β4BSIZEit + β5FSIZEit + εt…... (3) 
Where, 
STD= Short-term debt Ratio 
LTD= Long-term debt Ratio 
TD=Total Debt Ratio 
OWCN= Ownership Concentration 
ROA= Return on Asset 
TANG= Tangibility 
BSIZE= Board Size 
FSIZE= Firm Size 
i= firms 
T= time 
ɛ = Error term 
β0= constant term 
Generally, there are two dimensions in panel data models; the first one is the cross-sectional dimension (N) 
and another is the time series dimension (T). It is expected that alone cross-sections and time-series data 
analysis (where N=1 & T=1 respectively) are found very simple than panel data estimators. But in some 
situations panel data may enable the actual computation and interference. However, all variables of this study 
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explain the change both in term of units and times. The panel regression model of dependent variables Y and 
independent variables X, with units i and time period t, examine in the following equation. 
Yit = ɑit + βit Xit + ɛit….. (4) 
Where N is a unit number, T is time, Ɛit is the error term, ɑit is a parameter of constant and βit is a parameter 
of the slope. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
STD 156 1.675263 15.8934 0.0170762 198.8657 
LTD 156 0.1014717 0.1039408 0.00 0.4236185 
TD 156 1.776735 15.88518 0.1189307 198.8657 
OWCN 156 0.789375 1.125324 0.000 9.014391 
ROA 156 0.0881568 0.2326076 -2.295214 0.4654861 
TANG 156 0.5353455 0.2332898 0.0177425 1.00 
BSIZE 156 2.085101 0.2330203 1.386294 2.564949 
FSIZE 156 14.38215   2.01996 7.979339 18.81828 
Table 1 depicts the results of the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest used in the current study. 
The mean value of LTD is 10.14% that shows on average firms have less amount of LTD (Su & Li, 2013). In 
other words, on average firms have fewer amounts of LTD as compared to STD and LTD. The mean value 
of STD is 1.675 with Standard deviation value 15.893 with minimum value is 0.017 and the maximum value is 
198.86. TD has mean value 1.77 with minimum and maximum value of 0.11 and 1.98 respectively. Firm 
profitability (ROA) is very low (Su & Li, 2013), on average ROA is 8.08%. On average the value of OWCN is 
78.93%. The average value of TANG and BSIZE is 0.535 and 2.085 respectively. The mean of FSIZE 14.382. 
Correlation Analysis 
   Table 2: Correlation Analysis 
 STD LTD TD OWN ROA TANG BSIZE FSIZE VIF 
STD 1.0000         
LTD -0.0823   
0.3069  
1.0000        
TD 1.0000   
0.0000*** 
-0.0758    
0.3468 
1.0000       
OWCN 0.0042    
0.9589 
0.0369  
0.6474   
0.0044    
0.9565 
1.0000     1.04 
ROA -0.8314   
0.0000*** 
-0.0405   
0.6157 
-0.8321    
0.0000*** 
0.0940   
0.2429  
1.0000    1.46 
TANG 0.1653    
0.0392** 
0.5331    
0.0000*** 
0.1689   
0.0351** 
-0.1635   
0.0414** 
-0.3706  
0.0000***   
1.0000   1.46 
BSIZE -0.0506   
0.5308   
0.1053   
0.1907 
-0.0499 
0.5362    
-0.0689    
0.3924 
0.2308   
0.0037 
-0.0185  
0.8186   
1.0000  1.12 
FSIZE -0.2041 
0.0106 
0.4245 
0.0000*** 
-0.2014 
0.0117 
-0.0133 
0.8693 
0.2833 
0.0003 
0.2825 
0.0004 
0.2747 
0.0005 
1.0000 1.41 
*** Significance level 0.01, ** Significance level 0.05, and * Significance level 0.1 
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Table 2 shows the correlation analysis of the variables used in this study. The correlation between capital 
structure and OWCN is 0.0042 that depicts that there is a positive but insignificant relationship. The 
correlation among capital structure and ROA is -0.8314 at significant level 1%, it means there is a significant 
negative correlation. The correlation value of capital structure and TANG is 0.1653 at a significant level of 
5%, it shows there is a significant positive correlation. The correlation between capital structure and BSIZE is 
negatively but not significant with the value of -0.050. FSIZE is negatively correlated with debt structure with 
-0.2041. In addition to this, all the VIF values are less than 10 which depicts that there is no multicollinearity 
problem in data (Wooldridge, 2015). 
Regression Analysis 
Table: 3 (Regression Results) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES STDs LTD TD 
OWCN 1.041* 0.0111* 1.052* 
 (0.586) (0.00604) (0.585) 
ROA -66.65*** 0.0224 -66.63*** 
 (3.361) (0.0346) (3.355) 
TANG -14.09*** 0.222*** -13.87*** 
 (3.352) (0.0345) (3.346) 
BSIZE 10.30*** 0.0177 10.32*** 
 (2.944) (0.0303) (2.938) 
FSIZE 0.710* 0.0134*** 0.723* 
 (0.380) (0.00392) (0.380) 
Constant -17.42** -0.258*** -17.68** 
 (6.975) (0.0718) (6.962) 
Observations 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.751 0.383 0.752 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This study tested the hypothesis by using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the results are 
described in the table: 3 for all the measures of capital structure as dependent variables. For each dependent 
variable of capital structure, this study has used three models. The OWCN is positively associated with STD, 
LTD, and TD at 10% level of significance. Ownership concentration solves the agency conflict of interest 
among shareholders and managers. Normally, shareholders prefer debt financings over equity financings and 
in other words, it also depicts that larger shareholder has actively control over management due to a higher 
level of leverage. These results support to H1 and the results are similar to the study of (Booth et al., 2001; 
Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Pindado & de La Torre, 2011). With regards to controlling variables, ROA has a 
statistically significant and negative relationship with STD and TD it is demonstrated that a higher level of 
leverage leads to lower ROA and these findings are supported with previous studies of (De Miguel & 
Pindado, 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, & Bender, 2005; Ozkan, 2001; Zeitun & Tian, 
2014). These results are similar to pecking order theory that reveals that firms usually focus on internal 
sources of funds in the case of high profit. While in contrast to this firms use external sources of funds when 
they have low profit. In model 2, profitability has a positive significant relationship with LTD and this finding 
is similar to the study of (Simerly & Li, 2000; Weill, 2008). The result of TANG shows that it is statistically 
negative influenced by STD and TD. This finding is similar to the study of (Santarelli & Tran, 2018; Zeitun & 
Tian, 2014). Which indicates that firm with higher tangibility tends to have lower firm performance and this 
support to pecking order theory. Chemicals firms invest a great portion into fixed assets which do not 
enhance the performance. In other words, firms have not properly used for fixed assets. TANG also has a 
significant positive association with LTD at 5% of significant level, which supports to trade off theory and 
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says that tangibility can be useful in reducing the default risk of the chemical firm. BSIZE has a significant 
positive relationship with capital structure but it also has an insignificant impact with LTD and findings 
support to the study of (Abor, 2007). FSIZE is significant positive related to capital structure. So, FSIZE 
findings are consists of (Li & Singal, 2019) because larger firms afford the high debt and also support to trade 
off theory. This theory recommends that larger firms are more diversified, there will be fewer chances of 
bankruptcy and usually, these firms are preferred to more debt. R-square shows the degree of variation in 
capital structure due to all explanatory variables used in the current study. So here, R-square is high at 75% in 
Model 1, it is 38% in Model 2 and at Model 3 R-square is also 75%.  
Conclusion 
The main aim of this study is to measure the ownership structure impact on capital structure. This study used 
panel data for the period of 2012-2017 for Chemical firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. After 
employing pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the findings reveal that ownership structure has a 
significant positive association with capital structure. This stated that larger shareholders have a right to 
minimize the agency cost between managers and shareholders. They also monitor the team very effectively 
and efficiently due to the higher level of leverage. Profitability and Tangibility have a significant negative 
relationship with financial leverage. Board size also has a significant positive impact on leverage.  
The limitation of this study is the use of a small sample size of only chemical firms. These results are useful to 
different stakeholders like as the owners of the firms, government, investors, experts of finance and the 
academic community. These study findings provide helpful to owners especially shareholders of the firms 
who have managerial control in the firm. It is also helpful to understand that how to reduce the excesses of 
managers because managers can employ the resources of firms to maximize the firm value instead of the 
benefits that are adverse for the wealth of minority owners. It would be interesting in future research to 
increase the size of firms and can use a different proxy of ownership structure such as institutional ownership, 
managerial ownership and family ownership impact on leverage. 
References 
Abdullah, A. K. (2005). Capital structure and debt maturity: evidence from listed companies in Saudi Arabia. 
Journal of Business and Economics.  
Abor, J. (2005). The effect of capital structure on profitability: an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana. 
The journal of risk finance, 6(5), 438-445.  
Abor, J. (2007). Capital structure and financing of SMEs: empirical evidence from Ghana and South Africa. Stellenbosch: 
Stellenbosch University,  
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2003). Board structure, banking firm performance and the bank holding company 
organizational form. Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Proceedings. 
Ahmad, I., Saboor, A., & Nouman, M. (2018). Relationship Between Corporate Governance, Management 
Ownership and Capital Structure: Evidence from Pakistan Stock Exchange. International Journal of 
Business Studies Review, 4(1), 1-12.  
Ahmed Sheikh, N., & Wang, Z. (2012). Effects of corporate governance on capital structure: empirical 
evidence from Pakistan. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 12(5), 629-641.  
SEISENSE Journal of Management 
Vol 2 No 4 (2019): DOI: https://doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v2i4.162 , 51-64 
Research Article 
 
60 
Ahsan, T., Man, W., & Qureshi, M. A. (2016). Mean reverting financial leverage: theory and evidence from 
Pakistan. Applied Economics, 48(5), 379-388.  
Arulvel, K., & Ajanthan, A. (2013). Capital structure and financial performance: A study of listed trading 
companies in Sri Lanka. ACADEMICIA: An International Multidisciplinary Research Journal, 3(6), 1-13.  
Bae, J., Kim, S.-J., & Oh, H. (2017). Taming polysemous signals: The role of marketing intensity on the 
relationship between financial leverage and firm performance. Review of Financial Economics, 33, 29-40.  
Bajagai, R. K., Keshari, R. K., Bhetwal, P., Sah, R. S., & Jha, R. N. (2019). Impact of Ownership Structure and 
Corporate Governance on Capital Structure of Nepalese Listed Companies. In Business Governance and 
Society (pp. 399-419): Springer. 
Bany-Ariffin, A., Nor, F. M., & McGowan Jr, C. B. (2010). Pyramidal structure, firm capital structure 
exploitation and ultimate owners' dominance. International Review of Financial Analysis, 19(3), 151-164.  
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1994). Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and cause a" credit crunch" in 
the United States? Journal of Money, credit and Banking, 26(3), 585-628.  
Bevan, A. A., & Danbolt, J. (2002). Capital structure and its determinants in the UK-a decompositional 
analysis. Applied Financial Economics, 12(3), 159-170.  
Booth, L., Aivazian, V., Demirguc‐ Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2001). Capital structures in developing 
countries. The journal of finance, 56(1), 87-130.  
Briones, O., & Chang, M. (2017). Capital Structure Determinants Influence: A Comparative Study. Paper presented at 
the Proceedings of International Academic Conferences. 
Bunkanwanicha, P., Gupta, J., & Rokhim, R. (2008). Debt and entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and 
Indonesia. European Journal of Operational Research, 185(3), 1578-1595.  
Céspedes, J., González, M., & Molina, C. A. (2010). Ownership and capital structure in Latin America. Journal 
of business research, 63(3), 248-254.  
De Miguel, A., & Pindado, J. (2001). Determinants of capital structure: new evidence from Spanish panel 
data. Journal of corporate finance, 7(1), 77-99.  
Donaldson, G. (1961). “Corporate  debt  capacity:  a  study  of  corporate  debt  policy  and  the  determination   of   
corporate   debt   capacity”. Graduate   School   of   Business,   Harvard   University Press, Boston, Mass. 
Drobetz, W., Janzen, M., & Requejo, I. (2018). Ownership Concentration, Investment, and Firm Value in the 
Shipping Industry. published by Hamburg Financial Research Center.  
Farooq, O. (2015). Effect of ownership concentration on capital structure: evidence from the MENA region. 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 8(1), 99-113.  
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2003). Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure. Journal of financial 
economics, 67(2), 217-248.  
SEISENSE Journal of Management 
Vol 2 No 4 (2019): DOI: https://doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v2i4.162 , 51-64 
Research Article 
 
61 
Friend, I., & Lang, L. H. (1988). An empirical test of the impact of managerial self‐ interest on corporate 
capital structure. The journal of finance, 43(2), 271-281.  
Gaud, P., Jani, E., Hoesli, M., & Bender, A. (2005). The capital structure of Swiss companies: an empirical 
analysis using dynamic panel data. European Financial Management, 11(1), 51-69.  
Ghorbal-Blal, I. (2008). An exploration of the role of the construct of control in expansion strategy of hotel chains: A 
multiple-case study. (DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,  
Granado‐ Peiró, N., & López‐ Gracia, J. (2017). Corporate Governance and Capital Structure: A Spanish 
Study. European Management Review, 14(1), 33-45.  
Grewatsch, S., & Kleindienst, I. (2017). When does it pay to be good? Moderators and mediators in the 
corporate sustainability–corporate financial performance relationship: A critical review. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 145(2), 383-416.  
Haron, R. (2018). FIRM LEVEL, OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND INDUSTRY LEVEL 
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN AN EMERGING MARKET: INDONESIA 
EVIDENCE. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting & Finance, 14(1).  
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. The journal of finance, 46(1), 297-355.  
Huang, G. (2006). The determinants of capital structure: Evidence from China. China economic review, 17(1), 14-
36.  
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.  
Kajananthan, R. (2012). Effect of corporate governance on capital structure: case of the Srilankan listed 
manufacturing companies. Researchers World, 3(4), 63.  
Kayo, E. K., & Kimura, H. (2011). Hierarchical determinants of capital structure. Journal of banking & finance, 
35(2), 358-371.  
Khawaja, M., Bhatti, I., Ashraf, D., & Henry, D. (2018). The Role of Ownership and Governance Structure in 
Raising Capital: An International Study. 9th Conference on Financial Markets and Corporate Governance 
(FMCG) 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102108 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102108  
 
Kraus, A., & Litzenberger, R. H. (1973). A state‐ preference model of optimal financial leverage. The journal of 
finance, 28(4), 911-922.  
Li, Y., & Singal, M. (2019). Capital structure in the hospitality industry: The role of the asset-light and fee-
oriented strategy. Tourism Management, 70, 124-133.  
Liaqat, I., Saddique, S., Bagh, T., Khan, M. A., Naseer, M. M., & Khan, M. A. (2017). Capital Structure as 
Driving Force of Financial Performance: Case of Energy and Fuel Sector of Pakistan. International 
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 7(1), 86-101.  
SEISENSE Journal of Management 
Vol 2 No 4 (2019): DOI: https://doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v2i4.162 , 51-64 
Research Article 
 
62 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The business lawyer, 
59-77.  
Liu, G., & Sun, J. (2010). Ultimate ownership structure and corporate disclosure quality: evidence from China. 
Managerial Finance, 36(5), 452-467.  
Liu, Q., Tian, G., & Wang, X. (2011). The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence 
from Chinese listed firms. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 16(2), 254-276.  
Margaritis, D., & Psillaki, M. (2010). Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance. Journal of 
banking & finance, 34(3), 621-632.  
Marobhe, M. I., & es Salaam-Tanzania, D. (2014). The Influence of Capital Structure on the Performance of 
Manufacturing Companies: Empirical evidence from listed companies in East Africa. Research Journal of 
Finance and Accounting, 5(4), 2014.  
Mazur, K. (2007). The determinants of capital structure choice: evidence from Polish companies. International 
Advances in Economic Research, 13(4), 495-514.  
Mehran, H. (1992). Executive incentive plans, corporate control, and capital structure. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative analysis, 27(4), 539-560.  
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. 
The American economic review, 48(3), 261-297.  
Muchiri, M. J., Muturi, W. M., & Ngumi, P. M. (2016). Relationship between Financial Structure and Financial 
Performance of Firms Listed at East Africa Securities Exchanges. Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, 
Finance and Banking.  
Mukherjee, S., & Mahakud, J. (2010). Dynamic adjustment towards target capital structure: evidence from 
Indian companies. Journal of Advances in Management Research, 7(2), 250-266.  
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 5(2), 147-175.  
Myers, S. C. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. The journal of finance, 39(3), 574-592.  
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have. Journal of financial economics, 13(2), 187-221.  
Nawaz, T., & Haniffa, R. (2017). Determinants of financial performance of Islamic banks: An intellectual 
capital perspective. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 8(2), 130-142.  
Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (1997). Taking stock: does equity-based compensation increase managers' 
ownership? New York University, Center for Law and Business, Working Paper No. 98-014. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=8441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.8441.  
Ozkan, A. (2001). Determinants of capital structure and adjustment to long run target: evidence from UK 
company panel data. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 28(1‐ 2), 175-198.  
SEISENSE Journal of Management 
Vol 2 No 4 (2019): DOI: https://doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v2i4.162 , 51-64 
Research Article 
 
63 
Paramanantham, N. S., Ting, I. W. K., & Kweh, Q. L. (2018). Ownership Concentration and Debt Structure: 
Evidence from Top 100 PLCs in Malaysia. Institutions and Economies.Available at: 
<https://ijie.um.edu.my/article/view/11946>.  
Pindado, J., & de La Torre, C. (2011). Capital structure: new evidence from the ownership structure. 
International Review of Finance, 11(2), 213-226.  
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from 
international data. The journal of finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.  
Rajput, B., & Chawla, V. (2019). Theoretical Review of Capital Structure and Its Determinants. Paper presented at the 
International Scientific and Practical Conference" Innovative ideas of modern youth in science and 
education". 
Ramadan, I. Z. (2013). Debt-performance relation. Evidence from Jordan. International Journal of Academic 
Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 3(1), 323-331.  
Riaz, S. (2015). Impact of Capital Structure on Firm’s Financial Performance: An 
Analysis of Chemical Sector of Pakistan. Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-846X An International Peer-reviewed Journal, Vol.12, 10.  
Saad, N. M. (2010). Corporate governance compliance and the effects to capital structure in Malaysia. 
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2(1), 105-114.  
Sadeghian, N. S., Latifi, M. M., Soroush, S., & Aghabagher, Z. T. (2012). Debt policy and corporate 
performance: empirical evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange companies. International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 4(11), 217.  
Salehi, M., Lotfi, A., & Farhangdoust, S. (2017). The effect of financial distress costs on ownership structure 
and debt policy: An application of simultaneous equations in Iran. Journal of Management Development, 
36(10), 1216-1229.  
Salim, M., & Yadav, R. (2012). Capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian listed 
companies. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 65, 156-166.  
Santarelli, E., & Tran, H. T. (2018). The interaction of institutional quality and human capital in shaping the 
dynamics of capital structure in Viet Nam. Working Papers, World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University.  
Santos, M. S., Moreira, A. C., & Vieira, E. S. (2014). Ownership concentration, contestability, family firms, 
and capital structure. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(4), 1063-1107.  
Saona, P., San Martín, P., & Jara, M. (2018). Group Affiliation and Ownership Concentration as 
Determinants of Capital Structure Decisions: Contextualizing the Facts for an Emerging Economy. 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 1-18.  
Shah, A., & Khan, S. (2007). Determinants of capital structure: Evidence from Pakistani panel data. 
International Review of Business Research.  
SEISENSE Journal of Management 
Vol 2 No 4 (2019): DOI: https://doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v2i4.162 , 51-64 
Research Article 
 
64 
Shah, M. H., Zuoping, X., Abdullah, & Shah, M. K. (2018). The Effect of a Complex Ownership Structure 
and Judicial Efficiency on Leverage: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Companies. Emerging Markets 
Finance and Trade(just-accepted).  
Simerly, R. L., & Li, M. (2000). Environmental dynamism, capital structure and performance: a theoretical 
integration and an empirical test. Strategic management journal, 31-49.  
Su, K., & Li, P. (2013). The effects of ultimate controlling shareholders on debt maturity structure. Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 29(2), 553.  
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The journal of finance, 43(1), 1-
19.  
Tsuruta, D. (2017). Variance of Firm Performance and Leverage of Small Businesses. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 55(3), 404-429.  
Turan, G., & Hasanaj, S. (2014). Determinants of capital structure: evidence from banking sector in Albania. 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(13), 482.  
Vătavu, S. (2015). The impact of capital structure on financial performance in Romanian listed companies. 
Procedia Economics and Finance, 32, 1314-1322.  
Vieira, E. S. (2017). Debt policy and firm performance of family firms: the impact of economic adversity. 
International Journal of Managerial Finance, 13(3), 267-286.  
Vithessonthi, C., & Tongurai, J. (2015). The effect of firm size on the leverage–performance relationship 
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 29, 1-29.  
Voulgaris, F., Asteriou, D., & Agiomirgianakis, G. (2004). Size and determinants of capital structure in the 
Greek manufacturing sector. International Review of Applied Economics, 18(2), 247-262.  
Wald, J. K. (1999). How firm characteristics affect capital structure: an international comparison. Journal of 
Financial Research, 22(2), 161-187.  
Weill, L. (2008). Leverage and corporate performance: does institutional environment matter? Small Business 
Economics, 30(3), 251-265.  
Wiwattanakantang, Y. (1999). An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7(3-4), 371-403.  
Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach: Nelson Education. 
Xinyuan, Z., Nan, B., & Yufei, Z. (2017). Ownership Concentration, Financial Leverage and Inefficient 
Investment-evidence from Chinese A-share Market. Applied Finance and Accounting, 3(2), 70-75.  
Zeitun, R., & Tian, G. (2014). Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence from Jordan. 
Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, Forthcoming.  
  
